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Background 
This is one of a series of short papers which explain conceptual or methodological approaches 
underpinning analysis undertaken in CASE’s research programme Social Policy in a Cold Climate 
(SPCC). SPCC is designed to examine the effects of the major economic and political changes in 
the UK since 2007, particularly their impact on the distribution of wealth, poverty, inequality and 
social mobility.  It also examines geographical variations in policy, spending, outputs and 
outcomes, with a particular focus on London. The analysis includes policies and spending 
decisions from the last period of the Labour government (2007-2010), including the beginning of 
the financial crisis, as well as those made by the Coalition government since May 2010.The 
programme will conclude in 2015, with publication of a final volume. Interim reports will be 
published in 2013/14, and made available online at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case. 
 
Social Policy in a Cold Climate is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Nuffield 
Foundation, with London-specific analysis funded by the Trust for London. The views expressed 
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the funders. 
 
Introduction 
Under the Conservative administration 1979-1997, there was considerable debate about the 
boundaries of the welfare state: what should be provided by the state, what could or should be 
provided through the market, what mix of tax finance and private insurance or out-of-pocket 
payments was desirable, what aspects of welfare should be the responsibility of the individual and 
what of the state?. The prevailing ideology was to reduce taxation and minimise state intervention; 
to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’, especially the welfare state. 
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This produced initiatives such as ‘contracting out’ services like hospital cleaning, the Right to Buy 
council housing, and the opportunity  for schools to opt out of local authority control - each of which 
was fiercely resisted in some quarters.  
 
The political and public debate was intense, but some of the reforms were relatively small in 
volume and expenditure terms. In order to quantify the scale of the changes, the Welfare State 
Programme at LSE developed a framework for analysing public/private boundaries in welfare, 
based on three dimensions: finance, provision and decision, which could be public or private in any 
combination (Figure 1) (Burchardt, 1997; Burchardt, Hills and Propper, 1999). Earlier analyses had 
relied on the two dimensions of purchase and provision (Peacock, Glennerster and Lavers, 1968; 
Glennerster, 1992), but increasingly it seemed that ‘purchase’ had two components: the funding of 
the service and the decision about which provider or how much of the service to buy. For example, 
nursery vouchers were tax-financed but the decision as to whether, where and how much to spend 
(up to the maximum) lay with private individuals (parents in this case).  
 
Figure 1. 
 
	
The three-dimensional framework developed by the Welfare State Programme has subsequently 
been applied to track changes in the patterns of public and private welfare across education, 
health, social care, housing and social security, including pensions (Smithies, 2005; Hills, 2011; 
Edmiston, 2011). The most recent analysis suggests that by 2007/8, the ‘pure public’ category (ie 
tax-financed, publicly provided services under public decision-making) accounted for just under 
half (48%) of expenditure, which was only slightly smaller than the corresponding proportion in 
1979/80 (52%). At the other end of the spectrum, the ‘pure private’ (free-market) category had 
grown from 24% of the total to 31%. In-between, there were significant increases in contracting out 
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(private provision, public finance and decision: rising from 6 to 10% of the total over the period), 
and slight falls in voucher-type schemes (public finance, private decision and either public or 
private provision: declining from 4.6 to 1.9% of the total in the case of public provision, and from 
9.7 to 7.1% in the case of private provision). Overall, the picture is one of considerably greater 
stability than one might have expected given the rate of reforms in public services and plethora of 
initiatives in welfare under successive administrations. Nevertheless, because the scale of public 
and private welfare expenditure is so large (£620.3 billion in 2007/8), even marginal changes in the 
distribution of spending across different forms of public/private activity can have a significant 
impact.  
 
The final years of the Labour administration and the first years of the Coalition government have 
witnessed yet further changes in the welfare landscape, and for this reason it may be timely to 
revisit the conceptual framework to assess its continued relevance for analysing welfare activity 
today. For example, where should the (short-lived) Child Trust Funds be classified? The providers 
were all in the non-public sector, but the largest providers were mutuals, so classifying them as 
‘private’ providers could be misleading. The initial voucher was state-financed, but parents could 
make top-ups (private finance) which were themselves tax-free (public finance). The decision 
about which provider to use was the parents’ (private decision), but if parents failed to make a 
choice, the state allocated the voucher to a particular provider on their behalf (public decision). 
Finally, the decision about how to use the fund was the child’s (private decision), but when to use it 
was fixed in legislation (not sooner than the child’s 18th birthday – public decision).  
 
In addition to innovations of this kind, the debate about ‘privatisation’ of welfare has also moved 
on. The question of the division of responsibility for welfare between individuals and the state has 
been vigorously renewed through cuts to social security for people of working age and has been 
given a new twist by the ‘Big Society’ agenda, introducing an idea of collective but voluntary 
provision. 
 
Other concerns centre on shifts towards greater use of private, especially for-profit, providers in 
spheres previously seen as the preserve of the public sector, such as NHS hospital care. Are 
‘knaves’ replacing ‘knights’ and to what extent does the motivation of the provider matter to the 
service delivered? To what extent can the setting of minimum standards, regulation and inspection 
substitute for direct control over provision? Can a service remain genuinely universal when access, 
admission or eligibility criteria are applied by individual providers, albeit under central guidance? 
Does the division of a service into the hands of multiple, potentially competing, providers, together 
with the downgrading of central supervisory bodies (such as Local Education Authorities) threaten 
fragmentation and lack of coordination?  
 
Finally, enthusiasm for behavioural economics and the idea of ‘nudge’ has led to innovations in the 
‘decision’ dimension, such as auto-enrolment in workplace pensions. While the decision itself may 
remain with the individual, the framing of that decision is public policy and is explicitly designed to 
influence the likely outcome. 
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Thus there may be ways in which each of the three dimensions of the original framework needs 
some redefinition, or, possibly new dimensions may be required to reflect the complexity of 
present-day welfare activity and debate. 
 
Overarching issues 
Before considering each dimension in turn, there are three general issues to be considered. Firstly, 
in order to analyse welfare activity overall, we need a common metric across services. Services 
themselves come in all sorts of shapes and sizes, and are commonly made up of composite parts, 
so categorising ‘services’ as public or private on the three dimensions is not feasible. Instead, we 
use the metric of spending (public and private) and allocate it across the various segments of 
Figure 1. So where, as is common, a service is partly tax-financed and partly financed by 
individuals (NHS dentistry with user charges, for example), each part can be allocated to the 
corresponding category in Figure 1.  Similarly, if a service is supplied by a mix of public and private 
providers (for example, welfare to work programmes), in principle the spending can be allocated 
proportionately to those categories.  
 
Secondly, for the purposes of an overall analysis of welfare, keeping a tight limit on the number of 
dimensions and categories (3 dimensions and 2 categories – public/private - in the original 
framework) is desirable.  However there may also be interest in looking in more detail within a 
particular area of welfare, such as education or health, in which case it may be possible to reflect 
finer distinctions, such as degrees of ‘publicness’ in the provision or decision dimensions. Or there 
may be interest in understanding one segment of the Figure in greater detail – for example, the 
privately provided, publicly financed segment - across welfare activity. Here again, there may be 
scope for introducing sub-divisions which would be unduly cumbersome in an overall analysis of 
welfare activity.   
 
Thirdly, in allocating spending on services across the Figure there is the question of how to treat 
capital investment, debt and current expenditure. The objective is to consider current expenditure 
but to incorporate debt repayments and an annualised flow of benefit from capital investment; for 
example, housing should be assessed in terms of current rental value, whether it is actually rented 
or owner-occupied. Of course this is easier in principle than in practice.  
 
Finance 
The original framework classified spending financed by national or local taxation, or National 
Insurance Contributions, as public finance. Its key characteristics are its compulsory and 
collectivised nature: you must pay, whether you use a particular service or not, and the relationship 
between what you pay in and the benefit or service you receive is indirect. This was contrasted 
with private finance, where only those who use the service pay, and whether or not you use the 
service is usually voluntary.  
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Potentially difficult cases discussed in the original framework included:  
 
 tax reliefs and allowances: considered to be tax expenditures and hence public;  
 Private Finance Initiative: although the initial funds are private (raised by for-profit 
companies), the long-run commitment is to repay the loans through taxation and they are 
therefore considered public finance; 
 user charges for publicly-provided services: considered to be private finance (the ‘public’ 
element is provision not finance); 
 benefits paid by employers (such as corporate medical insurance): considered to be in lieu 
of wages and hence classified as private;  
 benefits paid by trusts and charities (for example educational scholarships): considered to 
originate in private donations (albeit with tax relief) and hence classified as mainly private.  
 
The most hybrid case identified in the original framework was payments through the Child Support 
Agency. These are compulsory payments, enforced by the state. Their main effect is to reduce the 
(tax-funded) social security expenditure on lone parents, although a small part of the payment may 
be retained by the parent-with-care on top of her benefits. All this makes them appear to be public 
finance, but on the other hand, they do not appear as public spending in the national accounts and 
they are not collectivised – there is no cross-subsidy between families.  
 
More recently, there have been a number of new examples of co-funding, where services are 
partly publicly and partly privately financed. For example, the childcare element of Working Tax 
Credit, under which 70% of the cost of childcare (up to a maximum) could be reclaimed from the 
state, or school Academies, where in principle a private (or non-profit) sponsor supplies part of the 
initial capital and may continue to provide benefits-in-kind on an on-going basis, or higher 
education fees, which are levied on students and paid through student loans (private finance), but 
a proportion of which may not be repaid and hence fall to the Treasury (public finance).   It is often 
challenging empirically to separate these elements, but conceptually there is no problem: the 
publicly-funded pounds should be counted under public finance and the privately funded pounds 
should be counted under private finance.   
 
Perhaps one of the most complex areas in recent times as far as the ‘finance’ dimension is 
concerned is social housing. Since the late 1980s, we have witnessed large-scale stock transfers 
from local authorities to housing associations and other Registered Social Landlords (now called 
Registered Providers). Whether Registered Providers other than local authorities are themselves 
public or private bodies is contested (see ‘Provision’ below), but in addition, the sources of finance 
for social housing are very varied. In terms of current expenditure, rents (private finance) and 
Housing Benefit (public finance) remain the key sources (NAO, 2012). But the level at which rents 
are set is determined in part by the value of the stock and the Registered Provider’s debt - each of 
which represents a combination of previous public and private capital investment. Rents are also 
affected by the Registered Provider’s ability to borrow, which is in turn based not only on the value 
of its stock but also the expected future revenue stream, which is affected by the current and 
anticipated housing (especially Housing Benefit) policy regime. Moreover, Registered Providers 
may build housing for sale in the open market and use the proceeds to cross-subsidise spending 
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on social housing, a sort of private finance (the purchasers of the owner-occupied housing) for 
private not-for-profit provision, but where the purchasers are not the same as the beneficiaries (the 
subsidised tenants in the Registered Provider’s social housing). 
 
However, if we stick with the principle of categorising current rather than capital spending, on the 
basis that capital spending is reflected in revenue/expenditure flows eventually, and analysing the 
spending closest to the final welfare outputs, the situation becomes a little clearer. In addition to 
Housing Benefit, social tenants benefit from below-market rents. The majority of the subsidy is the 
result of public finance through one route or another; a minority is cross-subsidy from private 
finance generated by other activities of Registered Providers.  
 
Provision 
The question of whether a provider is public or private was considered in the original framework to 
depend on the degree to which the organisation was owned and controlled independently of 
Government. The original framework used the National Accounts scheme to classify organisations 
as public or non-public sector, with the latter including not-for-profit organisations as well as 
commercial organisations and private individuals. This meant that both “non-profit-making bodies 
serving persons” (including Housing Associations and universities), and “unincorporated 
businesses” (including GPs and dentists) were assigned to the non-public sector, as well as 
charities, mutuals and friendly societies. The one deviation from the National Accounts scheme 
was Grant Maintained schools, classified by National Accounts as non-public, but treated in the 
original public/private boundaries framework as public sector, on the grounds that their assets 
were owned by the state and their self-governing status could be removed by direct intervention of 
the Secretary of State if the school was held to be performing badly.  
 
HM Treasury (2010) describes the current classification of public and non-public sector bodies for 
the purposes of National Accounts, and ONS (2012) provides an index. The classification is 
governed by the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA95) and the key consideration is 
whether the body is controlled by central or local government, or by a public corporation. Control is 
the ability to determine general corporate policy, through ownership, specific legislation, or 
regulation. This may include the power to:  
 
 appoint of the majority of directors 
 replace directors in instances of poor performance 
 take control in instances of poor performance. 
 
Control may also be exercised through grant funding, where this makes up a large majority of the 
organisation’s total funding and is tied to government approval of a business or strategic plan. 
Whether or not an organisation is deemed to be in the public sector is assessed on the balance of 
these criteria. The government retaining special powers to prevent changes in ownership or 
prevent sale of assets is not normally sufficient in itself for a body to be classified as public sector. 
Similarly, being subject to regulation is not, in itself, sufficient to be counted as public sector. All 
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commercial activities are regulated to some extent (through the legal system), and some – for 
example, the operation of utility companies – are regulated to a greater extent than others. But the 
utility companies are nevertheless firmly in the private sector.  
 
Interestingly, there is overlap in the National Accounts criteria for classification of providers as 
public or non-public with both the finance and decision dimensions of our own framework. 
However, the provider classification remains distinct in so far as considerations of finance are in 
relation to the degree of control tied to the financing (eg approval of a business plan), and 
considerations of decision are at a strategic and organisational level, rather than at the level of the 
individual consumer.  
 
All state schools (i.e. those where no fees are charged), including City Technology Colleges 
(CTCs), Academies and Free Schools, are classified as public sector. According to ONS, the 
distinction between Foundation and Community schools on one hand, and CTCs, Academies and 
Free Schools on the other, is whether the control is operated by local or central government. There 
are, however, differences between these school types in the aspects of school functioning over 
which they are autonomous: Academies and Free Schools need not follow the National 
Curriculum, and Free Schools can in addition employ non-qualified teachers and can change the 
hours of the school day. However, all state (ie non-fee-paying) schools are subject to significant 
inspection, control, and in the last analysis, take-over, by either the local authority or the 
Department for Education and for this reason are classified as public providers.  
 
Further Education Colleges and Sixth Form Colleges were until recently classified as non-public 
sector but ONS recently decided this was mistaken and they have now been reclassified as public 
sector. Universities have always been classified as non-public, in the light of the greater autonomy 
they enjoy and the fact that a considerable share of their funding comes from non-state sources.  
 
Housing associations are classified as non-public sector for the purposes of national accounts, 
despite a significant degree of government regulation of their activities, including rent regimes. The 
status of housing associations has however been subject to legal challenge, and in one case the 
High Court ruled that a particular housing association was a ‘public authority’ under the Human 
Rights Act (Pinsent Masons, 2008). The current state of play seems to be that housing 
associations (and other Registered Providers except local authorities) are non-public sector for 
accounting purposes, but may have public duties under Human Rights and other legislation.  
 
Using the system of national accounts to classify welfare providers into public and non-public 
sector has the advantage of clarity and a definitive list. However, in a number of areas, the 
involvement of not-for-profit providers has grown considerably since the late 1990s. It would 
therefore be of interest to split the non-public sector into for-profit and not-for-profit. Many of the 
major new or growing actors in welfare provision are private not-for-profit: for example, voluntary 
sector providers in Early Years care, mutuals in health care, Academies and Free Schools in 
education, and housing associations benefitting from large scale voluntary stock transfers. 
Furthermore, a number of the controversial developments in welfare policy have concerned the 
use of private for-profit providers: A4E and Atos in social security and welfare to work 
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assessments, Circle taking over Hinchingbrooke hospital, the crisis in social care brought about by 
the collapse of Southern Cross, and the mis-selling of Mortgage Protection Insurance by high 
street banks. Being able to isolate the extent to which this part of the private provision has grown 
would be a useful function for a future version of the public/private welfare framework. 
 
In addition, schooling is one area of welfare in which even a public / voluntary sector / for-profit 
distinction seems too crude to capture some of the interesting shifts in the nature of providers, and 
the degree of regulation to which they are subject, which have occurred in the recent years. A sub-
analysis focusing specifically on schooling could usefully take into account ‘degrees of publicness’ 
among providers, depending both on the origins of the provider (eg LEA, charity or business) and 
on the regulatory regime, which depends on the type of school (eg Academy or Free School). 
 
Decision 
The original framework proposed two criteria for the ‘decision’ dimension: – the degree to which 
the individual consumer or user has agency, and degree to which s/he has the power of exit (terms 
borrowed from Hirschmann’s 1970 classic, Exit, Voice and Loyalty). Agency consists in how 
directly the individual consumer/user chooses the provider of the service, and how directly s/he 
chooses the amount of service. Exit consists in the availability of viable alternatives, ie alternatives 
reasonably similar from the consumer/user’s point of view in terms of accessibility (including 
geographic and price) and quality.  
 
A ‘private’ decision is therefore one where there is a range of suitable services available to the 
consumer/user, and the choice of service is made directly by him or her. A ‘public’ decision is one 
where either there are agents acting on behalf of consumers/users, or decisions on level of service 
and identity of provider are made by a public body rather than individuals. These are not clear-cut 
distinctions and there being two criteria (or three, if decision about level of service and identity of 
provider are treated as distinct considerations) means that there is room for ambiguity over a 
classification. The ‘decision’ dimension is much more a matter of degree than the ‘finance’ or 
‘provision’ dimensions.  
 
The original framework also emphasised that influence could also be exercised by 
consumers/users through ‘voice’ (the third component of Hirschmann’s typology), and that in some 
circumstances this could be as effective as ‘exit’, if not more so, in giving end users decision-
making power within a service. So a ‘public’ decision is not necessarily one immune from 
consumer/user influence.  
 
Recently, we have also seen ways in which ‘private’ decisions are not immune from public 
influence, as in the case of auto-enrolment in workplace pensions. While the individual ultimately 
can choose to opt-out, the default is to be opted-in, so the ‘private’ decision is framed by a public 
policy with the explicit objective of influencing private decisions.  
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Table 1 analyses a number of areas of welfare activity according to the three criteria of who 
chooses the provider, who chooses the amount of service received, and whether there are viable 
alternatives. The classification is broad-brush because the areas considered are not described in 
detail; a more detailed analysis of expenditure in each area would allow for finer distinctions to be 
made. Nevertheless the table illustrates some interesting contrasts.  
 
Decisions in education vary by the stage of education under consideration. In early years, parents 
are generally able to choose both the identity of the provider and the amount of service they wish 
to access (up to a maximum in the case of publicly-funded care for 2 to 4 year olds). Whilst the 
availability of affordable childcare is limited in places, there is nevertheless a range of providers 
from which to choose in most areas. Early years provision has been increasingly regulated, which 
effectively means that some decisions have been taken out of parents hands (by removing the 
worst providers and introducing greater conformity in the sector), but on the other hand new 
information has been provided which could in principle assist parental decision-making.  
 
In primary and secondary schooling, the range of types of schools has expanded considerably, 
and ‘parental choice’ has been the mantra since the 1980s. However by definition, schooling at this 
age is compulsory, so there is no parental (or child!)  decision about whether and how much 
schooling to use (aside from the option of home schooling), and in practice the choice of schools 
for many parents is limited by geography. Whether on balance this adds up to a public or private 
decision is controversial.  
 
In social care, there is a contrast in the ‘decision’ dimension between clients who use direct 
payments – for whom there is a greater degree of autonomy – and those who continue to receive a 
package determined by social services.  
 
Decision-making in healthcare has undergone repeated reforms since the 1980s but in the majority 
of cases, decisions continue to be made by intermediaries (GP consortia, Primary Care Trusts, GP 
fundholders) rather than by patients themselves. Patients may be given some choice over provider 
in the case of elective hospital treatment but this is from a significantly constrained set of providers. 
As with education, the classification of public/private decision is controversial, but on balance and 
at this high level of generality, it would seem to fall on the ‘mostly public’ side of the boundary.   
 
In housing, social rents have been significantly de-regulated, and there has become a 
progressively closer relationship between the private rented sector and social renting. Interestingly, 
the level at which Housing Benefit is paid now refers to local market rent: so the level of public 
finance is dependent in part on decisions in the ‘pure private’ sector (private finance, provision and 
decision). 
 
One recent development in the area of pensions is auto-enrolment for most employees not already 
in an occupational pension in a workplace pension, as mentioned above. This is an interesting 
blurring of the boundary between public and private decisions (along the lines of ‘nudge’ theory), 
but strictly speaking, the decision as to whether to enrol and  the amount to contribute (within 
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limits) remains with the employee. They do not have a choice of provider, but they can opt out and 
choose instead to contribute to a private pension, or not at all.  
 
Table 1: Areas of welfare activity by whether public or private decision 
	
 End user 
chooses 
provider? 
End user 
chooses 
amount? 
Viable 
alternatives? 
Public/ 
private 
decision 
Early years Y Y Y Private 
Compulsory education Y N Y/N Mostly public 
Further & higher  
education 
Y Y Y Private 
Social care – direct payments Y N Y Mostly private 
Social care – social services N N N Public 
Social care – privately funded Y Y Y Private 
Primary care Y Y Y Private 
Emergency hospital treatment N N N Public 
Elective hospital treatment Y N Y/N Mostly public 
Social housing N N N Public 
Private renting with Housing Benefit Y N Y/N Mostly public 
State pension N N N Public 
Workplace pension  N Y Y Mostly private 
Private pension Y Y Y Private 
Welfare to work N N N Public 
 
Finally, in welfare to work, publicly-funded, private (for profit and not-for-profit) providers have 
increasingly taken on responsibility for administration of schemes and, in effect, decisions about 
eligibility for a range of benefits. However, while an important and controversial shift, from the end-
user’s perspective, it does not alter the fact that they have no choice over the identity of the 
provider or how much of their service to use, and nor do they have an ‘exit’ option, without 
forfeiting their benefits altogether.  
  
Missing dimensions? 
The three dimensions of the original framework, finance, provision and decision, seem to capture 
much of the variation in combinations of public and private welfare activity that we are interested 
in. But there is one other aspect of welfare activity which is a candidate for a fourth dimension, 
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namely, the degree to which the activity is regulated. This is of particular relevance in the context 
of increasing involvement of non-public sector providers in publicly-funded welfare, since one of 
the ways in which policymakers may seek to safeguard the public purse, and allay fears of 
malpractice especially in the for-profit sector, is to impose tight regulation on new providers. Since 
all regulation is public (although in an intriguing twist, the enforcement of regulation is now in some 
cases carried out by private bodies: OFSTED has contracted-out its inspections), a new 
‘regulation’ dimension of the welfare activity analysis framework would be measured as more and 
less, rather than as public and private.  
 
Would an additional dimension of this kind be helpful? Consideration of the degree of regulation 
already arises in the classification of public/private providers: it is one of the factors that 
determines whether an organisations is considered to be under the control of central/local 
government or independent on it. However, as ONS make clear, regulation by itself is not sufficient 
to switch the classification of an organisation from private to public. Regulation is also relevant to 
the ‘decision’ dimension, in so far as it affects whether there are viable alternatives for the 
individual to choose between.   
 
All public sector providers are heavily regulated, so there would only be variation in a ‘regulation’ 
dimension amongst non-public provision. Similarly, all publicly-decided welfare activity is heavily 
regulated, so there would only be variation in the ‘regulation’ dimension amongst private decision. 
However, both privately and publicly financed activity may be more or less tightly regulated (for 
example, private pensions, GP services). It seems then that rather than adding a new dimension to 
the framework altogether, it would be interesting to look at the degree of regulation to which the 
privately-provided, privately-decided subsector is subject and how this has changed over time.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite considerable change in the welfare landscape over the last two decades, the discussion in 
this paper suggests that the three dimensions of the original public/private boundaries of welfare 
framework remain useful and relevant. Some refinements have been proposed:  
 
Finance – capital investment and debt should wherever possible be included as annualised flows 
of benefit / repayments, and allocated as public or private spending as appropriate 
 
Provision – the latest ONS national accounts public sector classification should be used. In 
addition, the non-public sector should be sub-divided into for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. 
For analysis of specific areas of welfare (especially schooling), as opposed to analysis of welfare 
activity overall, it may be desirable to consider ‘degrees of publicness’, based on the identity of the 
provider and the extent of regulation to which they are subject.   
 
Decision – three tests should be applied: (i) does the end user choose the provider, (ii) does 
she/he choose the amount of service, and (iii) to what extent are there viable alternatives. The 
public/private classification is based on the balance of responses to these questions. The decision 
dimension is more often a matter of degree than either the finance or provision dimension, so 
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where the purpose of the analysis is specifically concerned with this dimension, or with an area of 
welfare in which there have been important shifts in ‘decision’, a ‘mixed’ category could be usefully 
employed in addition to ‘public’ and ‘private’.   
 
Finally, analysis of the degree of regulation to which the privately-provided and privately-decided 
sub-sector of welfare activity is subject (whether publicly or privately funded) would provide an 
interesting addition to the framework. 
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